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College and University Regulation of
Racist Speech: Does Regulation Violate
the First Amendment?
1. Introduction
In October 1989, the Eastern District of Michigan, in Doe v.
University of Michigan,' held that the antidiscrimination policies 2
adopted by the University of Michigan violated the first amendment
free speech clause.' This case reflects the dilemma facing many of
the nation's colleges and universities that have been confronted with
an increase in the number of racial incidents on campus during the
last few years.' Many of these racial incidents take the form of ethnic and racial jokes,' satirical columns in college newspapers and
magazines,' demeaning grafitti, 7 and derogatory remarks and com1. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
2. Id. at 856. The University's policy applied to educational centers, including classroom
buildings, libraries, research laboratories, and recreation and study centers. Persons were subject to discipline for:
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual
on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national
origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status,
and that
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic
efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal safety; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering
with an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal safety; or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for
educational pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored
extra-curricular activities.
Id.
3. The first amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for the redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See Randolph, Black Students Battle Racism on College Campuses, EBoNY, December 1988, at 126, 130 ("America's college campuses are witnessing one of their most turbulent
and disturbing periods since the racial unrest of the '60's."). See also Weiner, Racial Hatred
on Campus, THE NATION, Feb. 27, 1989, at 260 ("The upsurge in campus racism is the most
disturbing development in university life across the nation during the past decade.").
5. See Weiner, supra note 4, at 260. At the University of Michigan a student aired the
following "jokes" over the campus radio: "Why do blacks always have sex on their minds?
Because all their pubic hair is on their head . . . .Who are the two most famous black women
in history? Aunt Jemima and Mother F
r." Id.
6. See THE CHRONICLE, Nov. 21, 1989, at 1,col. I. (College newspaper of Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. Copy on file at the Dickinson Law Review office). See also
N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
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ments.8 This type of harassment, which creates a hostile academic
atmosphere for the students who are the targets of these attacks, has
been termed "racist speech." 9 Currently, there are no available remedies for the victims of racist speech.'"
Some colleges and universities have responded to the problem
by adopting regulations that allow school officials to impose sanctions on the offending parties." These regulations purport to create
an atmosphere that is free of harassment of students that belong to
minority groups."l Unfortunately, the regulations also inhibit speech
and raise the question of whether such restrictions on speech violate
the first amendment. The situation is particularly complex and
troubling because the university, on the one hand, is considered a
"marketplace of ideas" and only minimal restrictions should be
placed on speech.' 3 On the other hand, all students should be able to
pursue their educational goals without feeling intimidated,
threatened, or harassed because of their racial or ethnic background.
This Comment analyzes the viability of adopting antiharassment policies on campuses." Section II of the Comment gives a brief
history of the efforts made to achieve racial equality within educational institutions. Section III discusses the state of racial intolerance
7. See Randolph, supra note 4, at 126, 128. (At Smith College, Northhampton, Mass.,
1986: The slogan, "Niggers, Spics and Chinks quit complaining or get out" was found spray
painted on a campus building. Epithets "nigger" and "KKK" were scrawled on a freshman's
door at Indiana University).
8. Id. See also Weiner, supra note 4, at 260 ("The litany [among white students] is that
black people tend to be criminal drug addicts and welfare cheats; that they don't work; and
black students aren't as smart as whites." Id.).
9. See Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2333 (1989). Matsuda describes racist speech as "[tihe hate speech
flaring up in our midst includ[ing] insulting nouns for racial groups, degrading caricatures,
threats of violence, and literature portraying Jews and people of color as animal-like and requiring extermination." Id. (footnote omitted).
10. See id. at 2321 (advocating formal criminal and public sanctions for injuries that
result from racist speech). Cf. Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action For Racial Insuits, Epithets and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) (suggesting a cause
of action in tort for victims of racist speech).
11. See Carmody, Trying to Make Campuses Civil (and Safe) Again, N.Y. Times, Nov.
22, 1989, at BIO, col. 3. See also Powell, Campus Tongue-Leashing Expands, INSIGHT, Jan.
15, 1990, at 52 (stating that a "dozen or more schools" have adopted policies against harassing
speech).
12. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Compare supra note 2 with infra note 110 and
accompanying text. Each regulation employs different language.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 150-71.
14. Most antiharassment policies include provisions regarding gender, age, veteran status, and sexual preference. This Comment will address these aspects of the regulations only
insofar as they affect the terms regarding racial and ethnic discrimination. The primary focus
of this Comment is on issues relating to the freedom of speech in the context of antiracist
regulations. Although the regulations may raise other legal issues, such issues are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
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on campuses today and the attempts to regulate discriminatory conduct. Section IV examines the constitutionality of the antidiscriminatory regulations in light of four factors: the restrictions the
Supreme Court has placed on free speech; the language of the various regulations; the private or public nature of the college or university; and, the balancing of the interests of the academic institution.
Section V explores the impact of the regulations on students. The
comment concludes by stating that restricting racist speech will not
alleviate racial tension and, therefore, is not the solution to the racial
problems on campuses.
1I.

Racism in Education: An Overview

A. Desegregation and the Supreme Court
Before the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education,15
the Supreme Court had attempted to provide equal opportunities to
black students"6 with respect to graduate education. 7 Until Brown
was decided, education was provided to black students on a "separate but equal" basis.1 The Court, however, realized that it was impossible to apply this doctrine to institutions of higher learning. 9
The demand for graduate programs was not great enough to justify
the expenditure of resources necessary to establish exclusive programs for black students.2 0
In Brown, the Supreme Court held that segregation in public
schools violated the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause."
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. The early discrimination cases in education involved black students. See infra note
17. Today, racial issues usually involve members of various minority groups, which include
Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics. See, e.g., supra note 9.
17. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (The Court
held that providing a graduate education on a segregated basis violated the equal protection
clause and that black students could not get the same experience as white students if the state
prohibited them from commingling with the white students); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950) (holding that a separate law school for blacks did not provide the same legal education
as did the University of Texas Law School, which was a superior law school in every respect);
Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 322 U.S. 631 (1948) (The Court directed the University of
Oklahoma to admit Ada Sipuel, a black student who was seeking a legal education, to its law
school); Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that since Missouri
did not provide the opportunity for a legal education to blacks, Gaines, a black student, was
entitled to be admitted to the law school of the State University).
18. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1886) (establishing the "separate but equal"
doctrine in the context of railroad facilities).
19. L. MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE NEGRO, at 337 (1966).

20. Some states attempted to resolve these problems by adding some graduate programs
to the undergraduate curriculum. The court, however, stated that this procedure did not allow
for a curriculum comparable to ones at the state schools. Id. at 342.
21. The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "No State
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The Court was then faced with the herculean task of implementing
its decision. 2 The Court's insistence that schools make a "prompt
and reasonable start upon full compliance" 3 was met with hostility
and attempts by school communities to thwart the decision.24 A
struggle to establish racial harmony within the educational system
continued in the plethora of cases that followed Brown.2 5
B.

Racial Tension on Campus

The struggle for racial equality was not restricted to the area of
education, but expanded into other areas in which whites were
clearly privileged.2" During the 1960s and early 1970s, black college
students actively supported the civil rights movement. 7 Violence and
disruption prevailed on campuses across the country.2 8 Both black
and white students protested against the disparate treatment of minorities in society. 9 During this period, students took a firm stand on
expressing their constitutional rights.3 "
In the 1970s, colleges and universities implemented affirmative
31
action programs to increase the enrollment of minority students.
The Supreme Court, in Regents of University of California v.
Bakke,32 discussed these programs that set forth lower admissions
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S CONST. amend XIV.
22. See generally L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-19 (1978).
23. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
24. See McKay, With All Deliberate Speed, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1956); Powe, The
Road to Swann: Mobile County Crawls to the Bus, 51 TEX. L. REV. 505 (1973).
25. See e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971) (giving
the district courts broad discretion in reaching the objective of having an integrated school
system); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (stating that a school zoning procedure
that allowed students to transfer to a school at which they would be in a racial majority
fostered segregation); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (condemning the school board's
action in attempting to delay the desegregation process). In addition, Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 that stated: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assislance." 42 US.C.A § 2000e (West 1981).
26. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 22, at § 16-18.
27. See generally THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST,
at 91-116 (Arno Press Inc. reprint ed. 1970) (The goal of black students was liberation. Their
aim was to be free to "compete on equal terms with all other Americans for access to the
opportunities, rewards, benefits, and powers of American Society." Id. at 115).
28. Id. at 3. The students were protesting against racial injustice, the Vietnam War, and
problems within the university system.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 22.
31. See Sowell, The New Racism on Campus, FORTUNE, Feb. 13, 1989, at 115.
32. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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standards for racially under-represented groups.3" The Court recognized the benefits of a diverse student body, but held that the policy
of the University of California at Davis was unfair because it set
minimum quotas for racial minorities.34 In his opinion, Justice Powell stated that "preferring members of any one group for no reason
other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake.""
II1.
A.

Racism and Free Speech: The Problems on Campuses
The Dilemma Facing Educators

Despite an effort to alleviate racial tensions, the problem persists on campuses.36 In fact, racial tensions seem to have increased
during the last few years.37 Some educators feel that part of the
problem is due to the affirmative action programs adopted by schools
to increase black and other minority enrollment.38 Others feel that
the situation at schools is merely reflective of a prevailing societal
problem.39
Colleges and universities have the option of refraining from taking action aimed at curtailing racial incidents. Schools should not,
however, remain passive. Not only do educational institutions have
an interest in promoting a peaceful academic environment, but they
also have the responsibility of setting certain standards of conduct.'
33. Id.
34. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265 (opinion of Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the
Court).
35. Id. at 309. Cf DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per curiam) (White
applicant claimed that the University of Washington Law School had discriminated against
him because the school had a lower admissions standard for minority applicants. The Supreme
Court vacated and remanded the case as moot on the ground that the plaintiff had, in the
meantime, been admitted to law school and would get a law degree regardless of the outcome
of the case).
36. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
38. See Sowell, supra note 31, at 116 (commenting on a statement made approximately
twenty years ago by Professor Clyde of the University of Pennsylvania that it was "irresponsible, if not cruel" to admit minority students to institutions when they would find it difficult to
keep up academically, or even to survive).
39. See Randolph, supra note 4, at 130.
[T]he reasons behind the resurgence of campus racism are complex and
multilayered, but the consensus among educators, activists and students is clear:
the primary cause of this bigotry is but a mirror of the nation's larger political
climate .... "The environment created by the Reagan administration is largely
responsible . . . . Students have read the administration's attacks on affirmative
action and civil rights as license to act in a heretofore unacceptable fashion. The
students get their cues from the top, and when you have a President and an
Attorney General saying it's okay to act out your racism, this is what happens."
Id. quoting Frank Matthews, Professor of Law at George Mason University.
40. See Spencer, The Courts and the Colleges, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Apr.
1987, at 310.
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In addition, if racial tension is not addressed, the victims may eventually retaliate and violence may ensue.4 1 Minority enrollment in
predominantly "white" schools may also decline, and students may
choose instead to go to schools where they will not be harassed and
insulted.4 2 Allowing the situation to fester could also create segregation at schools. This in turn could have an adverse impact on
43
society.
Some commentators believe, however, that any attempt to curb
racist speech would be an egregious violation of students' first
amendment rights." This is especially true on college campuses
where the freedom to exchange ideas is sacred, and any restrictions
on this freedom would be repugnant to academic life. The commentators suggest that the best way to fight offensive speech is not with
regulations but with more speech.4 5 They believe that "[m]ore
speech, not less, is the proper cure for offensive speech unless and
until the controversial speech runs into such narrow constraints as
the barrier to incitement to immediate illegal action."4 6 The commentators also fear that regulating racist speech on college campuses
will set a dangerous precedent, which may eventually lead to infringements on not only abhorrent speech, but also on speech that
contains ideas and information that most would hold valuable.4 7
B.

Doe v. University of Michigan

The racist incidents that occurred on the University of Michigan's Ann Arbor campus in early 198748 prompted the university
administration to draft the regulations challenged in Doe v. University of Michigan.49 The regulations prohibited the use of any language or gestures that would be offensive to certain groups of peo41. See Weiner, supra note 4, at 261 (commenting that American culture condones violence as a means of resolving disputes).
42. Id.
43. See Randolph, supra note 4, at 130.
44. See N.Y. Times, supra note 6, at A20, col. 1.
45. Id.
46. Id. (quoting Gerald Gunther, Professor of Constitutional Law at Stanford
University).
47. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
48. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Examples
of racial incidents that caused the university to take action include the following:
On January 27, 1987, unknown persons distributed a flier declaring "open
season" on blacks, which it referred to as "saucer lips, porch monkeys, and
jigaboos." On February 4, 1987, a student disc jockey at an on-campus radio
station allowed racist jokes to be broadcast. At a demonstration protesting these
incidents, a Ku Klux Klan uniform was displayed from a dormitory window.
Id.
49. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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pie.5 University officials could impose sanctions on offenders.' The
type of sanctions imposed depended on the gravity of the offense and
the intent of the offending student. 2 Punishment ranged from formal reprimands to expulsion.5 Originally, the administration had
published an interpretive guide54 to give examples of offensive communication, but withdrew the guide befor.e implementing the
policy."
The plaintiff in Doe was a graduate psychology student whose
specialty was biophysiology.5 6 The plaintiff challenged the University's policy on the ground that it impermissibly chilled his right to
discuss certain theories connected with his research. 7 He asserted
that the policy should be "declared unconstitutional and enjoined on
the grounds of vagueness and overbreadth." 58 The court agreed and
stated that it is "fundamental that statutes regulating First Amendment activities must be narrowly drawn to address only the specific
evil at hand." 59
Although "sympathetic to the University's obligation to ensure
50. See id. at 856.
5 I. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 857. The University could impose the following sanctions: (I) formal reprimand; (2) community service; (3) class attendance; (4) restitution; (5) removal from University housing; (6) suspension from specific courses and activities; (7) suspension; and (8) expulsion. Id. For information regarding due process rights of students, see Annotation, Right of
Student to Hearing on Charges Before Suspension or Expulsion from Educational Institution, 58 ALR.2d 903 (1989).
54. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 858 (E.D. Mich. 1989). The guide
was entitled What Students Should Know About Discriminationand DiscriminatoryHarassment by Students. It provided the following as examples of discriminatory conduct:
You exclude someone from a study group because that person is of a different race, sex, or ethnic origin than you are.
You tell jokes about gay men and lesbians.
Your student organization sponsors entertainment that includes a comedian
who slurs hispanics.
You display a confederate flag on the door of your room in the residence
hall.
You laugh at a joke about someone in your class who stutters.
You make obscene telephone calls or send racist notes or computer
messages.
You comment in a derogatory way about a particular person or group's
physical appearance or sexual orientation, or their cultural origin.
Id.
55. Id.
56. Biophysiology is the study of the biological bases of individual differences in personal
traits and mental abilities. Id. at 858.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 864 (E.D. Mich. 1989). See infra
notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
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equal educational opportunities for all its students,"6 0 the court
found that the University's efforts impermissibly interfered with free
speech. The University could not impose restrictions on speech
merely because it disagreed with the ideas or messages the speech
conveyed.6" The court stated that "even if speech exceeds all the
proper bounds of moderation, the consolation must be that the evil
likely to spring from the violent discussion will probably be less, and
its correction by public sentiment more speedy, than if the terrors of
law were brought to bear to prevent the discussion. "62 Thus, the
court allowed the University to effectuate that portion of its policy
designed to regulate physical violence, but enjoined the school from
implementing the sections regulating verbal harassment. 6"
It is noteworthy that the court attached an addendum to the
Doe opinion. The addendum states that if the members of the court
had read Professor Matsuda's article entitled Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story64 before filing its
opinion, the article "certainly would have sharpened the Court's view
of the issue."6 5 Professor Matsuda's article describes various forms
of "racist hate speech" ' 66 and suggests that criminal sanctions should
be imposed against the most serious offenses.6 The article acknowledges, however, the difficulty in striking the necessary balance in
such a sensitive area involving two compelling interests. 8
IV.

The Ability of Universities to Restrict Racist Speech

A.

The Supreme Court and the Regulation of Free Speech

Historically, the Supreme Court has strictly scrutinized statutes
and regulations that attempt to abridge the content of any speech. "9
The Court has stated, however, that first amendment rights are not
absolute. 70 In particular, the first amendment freedom of speech
60.
61.

Id. at 868.
Id. at 863.
62. Id. at 869 (quoting T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 429
(Da Capo ed. 1972)).
63. Id.
64. Matsuda, supra note 9.
65. Doe v, University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 869 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
66. Matsuda, supra note 9, at 2326-31.
67. Id. at 2321. These offenses should be "narrowly and explicitly defined." Id.
68.

See id.

69.

See L. TRIBE, supra note 22, at § 12-2. If a government regulation is aimed at

restricting communication, the Court presumes that such a regulation is unconstitutional. Id.
70. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (people are prohibited

from yelling "fire" in a crowded theatre).
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clause does not provide an "unlimited, unqualified right' ' 7 to speak

on any subject at any time. 7' The Court has qualified this viewpoint,
however, by emphatically stating that the only time Congress or the

States may abridge the right to free speech is when the speech is
reasonably regulated in "carefully restricted circumstances.1 73 One

of the earliest theories under which the Court allowed the content of
speech to be regulated was the doctrine of "clear and present
danger."
1. Requirement of Clear and Present Danger.-ln Dennis v.
United States,7 4 the defendants had been convicted under a federal
act for conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the United States
Government. 75 The Court analyzed whether the act was "contrary to
all concepts of a free speech and free press"' 76 by applying "the clear
and present danger test." '77 The Court adopted Chief Judge Learned
Hand's interpretation of the test, which requires that "in each case

[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger. ' 7 8 In applying this test, the Dennis Court found
the federal act was indeed constitutional.7 9
The "clear and present danger" test'seems to be applicable only
if the offensive speech incites violence. 0 Speech that merely advocates the propriety or necessity of violence is distinguishable.8" The
Supreme Court discussed the distinction in Brandenburg v. Ohio. 2

71. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951).
72. Certain categories of speech are exempted from first amendment protection. For example, regulations prohibiting obscene speech have been upheld. See Miller v. California, 412
U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (state statute regulating works that portray sexual conduct in "a patently
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value"). Speech that is vulgar, offensive and shocking is also subject to restrictions.
See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). But see, e.g., City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (speech that was considered offensive, even by a large number of people, could not be restricted). In addition,
libelous speech is unprotected speech and is regulated by state law. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1973); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1951).
73. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969).
74. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
75. Id. at 495-96.
76. Id. at 501.
77. Id. at 505.
78. Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (1950)).
79. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951).
80. For a criticism of the "clear and present danger test," see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 454 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 447-48.
82. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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In Brandenburg, the court held that the Ohio Criminal Syndication
Act, which purported to punish people for advocating violence, 83 was
unconstitutional.84 The activities of the supporters at a Ku Klux
Klan rally who chanted threats of revenge and violence against Jewish and black people while gathered around a burning cross were
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.8 5
Racist speech, however vicious, does not create a "clear and
present danger." Verbal threats against a particular group may arguably constitute clear and present danger.86 Unless speech is likely
to incite a crisis, however, legal action may not be taken to curtail
87
that speech.
2. Fighting Words.-Courts may use the doctrine of clear and
present danger to curtail speech only if that speech if likely to incite
a crisis.88 A separate but related form of speech that is not protected
by the first amendment is speech that has "a direct tendency to
cause acts of violence by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is addressed."8 9 The Supreme Court placed restrictions on the
use of these "fighting words" in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.9 °
The Chaplinsky Court upheld the constitutionality of a New Hampshire statute that prohibited the use of words that "are likely to
cause a fight."9 In the Court's interpretation, the statute also prohibited threatening, profane, or obscene revilings, and derisive and
annoying words that had the characteristic of plainly tending to
breach the peace.9 2 The Court reasoned that:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
83.
propriety'
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 448. ("The Act punishes persons who 'advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or
of violence 'as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform.
Id. at 449.
Id.
See Beaurhanais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)
[Il]f an utterance directed at an individual may be the object of criminal
sanctions, we cannot deny to a State power to punish the same utterance directed at a defined group, unless we can say that this is a wilful and purposeless
restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State.
Id. at 258. But see Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978)
(holding unconstitutional the attempts of Skokie, Illinois, a primarily Jewish community, to
stop a pending march of the Nazi Party).
87. See BOLLINGER. TOLERANCE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, at 7 (1986).
88. See id.
89. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1941).
90. 315 U.S. 568 (1941).
91. Id. at 573.
92. Id.
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the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or "fighting" words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite and immediate breach of peace. It
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part

of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-

ity. "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper
sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by
the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would
raise no question under that instrument."a

Under the Chaplinsky definition of "fighting words," it appears
that racist speech should not be protected by the first amendment.
Racist speech certainly does not convey any message of value to society, and if it did not exist, there would be less expression of racial
hatred. In addition, it cannot be refuted that racist speech is capable
of inciting violence as a reaction to the derogatory comments.9" The
best argument in support of antidiscriminatory regulations relies on
the "fighting words" doctrine. 95 The Chaplinsky doctrine has been
criticised, however, and, according to one commentator, is an old
rule that is no longer followed."
93. Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
309-10 (1940)).
94. See id. at 574 ("Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellations
'damned racketeer' and 'damned Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of peace.").
95. An argument could be made that "racist speech" falls within the scope of group
libel. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). In Beauharnais, the Court upheld a
state statute that prohibited the publication of any racially degrading material. See infra notes
115-21 and accompanying text. The rationale for the Court's decision. was based on the
Chaplinsky "fighting words" doctrine and on common law libel. The court stated:
[Ilf an utterance directed at an individual may be the object of criminal
sanctions, we cannot deny to a state power to punish the same utterance directed
at a defined group, unless we can say that this is a wilful and purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State.
Id. at 258.
Although the Court's theory appears to justify sanctions on racist speech, later cases undermine the holding of Beauharnais. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See
also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (holding unconstitutional the attempts of Skokie, Illinois, a primarily Jewish community, to prevent a pending
march of the Nazi Party).
96. See Powell, supra note I1,at 53. (The "fighting words" doctrine is "a very narrow
doctrine that the Supreme Court hasn't used in 40 years.") (quoting Paul Dennenfeld, the
legal director for the Michigan ACLU). See also People v. Dietze, No. 238, slip op. at 5
(N.Y. Dec. 19, 1989) (holding that a New York Statute, which prohibited people from using
abusive language with the intent to annoy or harass, was unconstitutional. The court stated
that the term "fighting words" was very narrow and thus the Chaplinsky doctrine did not
apply.)
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The Regulatory Language

In examining the constitutionality of a regulation, a court scrutinzes not only the content of the speech that the regulation seeks to
prohibit, but also the language of the regulation. The manner in
which a regulation is drafted is an essential factor in determining the
existence of a constitutional conflict. A regulation that in any way
97
infringes upon protected speech will be declared unconstitutional.
Thus, the language of such regulations is critical and drafters must
choose words carefully to avoid vagueness or overbreadth.
I. The Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrine.-Courts will
prohibit colleges and universities from enforcing a regulation that is
vague on its face. 98 The Supreme Court has held that any law that
was defined in "terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates due process of law." 9 9 A statute will be declared overbroad if
it imposes any direct restraints on protected speech.' 00 If the drafters
of a statute or regulation use language that is so imprecise that when
the statute is applied it creates a risk of chilling free speech, then it
is "properly subject to facial attack."'' Thus, "prior restraints must
be narrowly drafted so as to suppress only that speech that presents
a 'clear and present danger' of resulting in serious substantive evil
which a university has the right to prevent."' 0 2
The overbreadth doctrine was the focus of the court's analysis in
Doe v. University of Michigan."°3 The court found that the University of Michigan's regulations would have the effect of infringing
upon protected speech.' 0 4 For example, students could be disciplined
for making racially derogatory comments during academic discourse.'0° The court agreed with the University's position that stu97. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Stacy v. Williams, 300 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
99. Baggit v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964).
100. Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 968 (1984).
101. Id. See also Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333
(W.D. Va. 1987); University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson, 649 F. Supp.
1200 (D. Utah 1986) (The court, in both cases, used a balancing analysis and upheld the first
amendment rights of the students while placing the burden on the universities to draw up their
regulations with greater precision).
102. Stacy v. Williams, 300 F. Supp. 963, 971 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
103. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
104. Id. at 863.
105. Id. at 865-66. During a class orientation session, one student made a comment
regarding a rumor about the unfair treatment of minority students in the class. A minority
professor filed a complaint against the student. Similarly, other students were charged with
violating the regulations after they made discriminatory remarks in classroom settings. Id.
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dents making discriminatory remarks that are so offensive as to detract from the necessary educational climate should not be immune
from campus disciplinary proceedings. 06 According to the court, the

terms of the regulations were too vague to be enforced. 10 7 Thus, the
restrictions impermissibly infringed upon many forms of protected
communication, and caused an inherent conflict with the first
amendment.'
The court stated, however, that "the University may
subject all speech and conduct to reasonable and nondiscriminatory
time, place, and manner restrictions which are narrowly tailored and
which leave open ample alternative means of communication." ' 0 9
This raises the issue of how a college can draft regulations that are
narrow enough to satisfy the first amendment, yet are broad enough
to reach the racist speech that disrupts the academic environment
for many students.
2. Alternative Regulations.-To analyze this issue, it is helpful to examine the pertinent sections of the regulations adopted by
the University of Wisconsin. A student would be in violation of the
University's regulations:
(2)(a) For racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or
other expressive behavior directed at an individual or on separate occasions at different individuals, or for physical conduct, if
such comments, epithets, or other expressive behavior or physical conduct intentionally:
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry or
age of the individual or individuals; and
2. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education, university related work, or
other university authorized activity." 0
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 858.
Id.
Id. at 867.
Doe v. University of Michigan, 761 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989).

110.

UNIVERSITY

OF WISCONSIN SYSTEM WISCONSIN ADMINSTRATIVE

CODE Ch.UWS

17 (17.06) (copy on file at the Dickinson Law Review office). (This regulation addresses intentional harassment based on a victim's sex in a different section.). Compare id. with a private
university's regulations, such as the Regulations of Emory University (copy on file at the
Dickinson Law Review office), which provide:
It is the policy of Emory University that all employees and students should
be able to enjoy and work in an educational environment free from discriminatory harassment. Harassment of any person or group of persons on the basis of
race, color, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, age, handicap, or
veteran's status is a form of discrimination specifically prohibited in the Emory
University community. Any employee, student, student organization, or person
privileged to work or study in the Emory University community who violates this
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These regulations provide examples of the types of conduct that the
University can discipline. 1 1 In addition, any remarks that are made
in the course of a class discussion would not be subject to discipline." 2 Moreover, a student would not be in violation of the code if
no evidence exists that his purpose was to create a hostile environment."' These regulations have been in effect since August, 1989. l l4
There is no evidence, however, that shows whether they have been
effective.' 1 5
The Wisconsin regulations do not infringe upon the rights of
students to voice their opinions in a discussion that is of an academic
nature because such a discussion would not be directed against any
particular individual's racial or ethnic background. The speaker also
must have the intent to create for the victim a hostile atmosphere.
This requirement further narrows the scope of the regulation because the offender must intend to inflict emotional pain on the
victim.
The University of Wisconsin's rules do not violate any fundapolicy will be subject to disciplinary action up to and-including permanent exclusion from the University.
Discriminatory harassment includes conduct (oral, written, graphic or phys-.
ical) directed against any person or group of persons because of their race, color,
national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, age, handicap, or veteran's status and that has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of creating an offensive, demeaning, intimidating, or hostile environment for that person or group
of persons. Such conduct includes, but is not limited to, objectionable epithets,
demeaning depictions or treatment, and threatened or actual abuse or harm.
See also Policy of the University of Massachusetts (copy on file at the Dickinson Law Review
office), which provides:
RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF PLURALISM
The Board of Trustees affirms its commitment to maintaining an academic
environment which fosters pluralism, mutual respect, appreciation of divergent
views, and awareness of the importance of individual rights. To this end, we
reassert the importance of civility and valuable contribution that diversity in
race, ethnicity, religion and culture brings to the University community, and
therefore we strongly encourage and support racial, ethnic, cultural and religious
pluralism.
POLICY AGAINST INTOLERANCE
The Board of Trustees denounces ethnic, cultural, religious or racial intolerance which interferes with those rights guaranteed by law, and insists that such
conduct has no place in a community of learning. We also recognize the obligation of the University to protect the rights of free inquiry and expression, and
nothing in the Resolution in Support of Pluralism or Policy Against Intolerance
shall be construed or applied so as to abridge the exercise of rights under the
Constitution of the United States and other Federal and State Laws.
111. UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN CODE, supra note 110.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Powell, supra note 11, at 53.
115. Id. ("It is too soon to say whether the policies will help diminish racial tension on
campus.").
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mental principles of due process, based on comparison to the Illinois
statute that the Supreme Court upheld in Beauharnais v. Illinois.'"
The statute at issue in Beauharnais forbade the publication or exhibition of any material that portrayed "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue in a class of citizens, of any race, color,
creed, or religion.""' 7 In addition, the statute prohibited publication
or exhibition of any material that exposed "the citizens of any race,
color, creed, or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is
productive of the breach of peace or riots . ..."I"
The petitioner in Beauharnais was convicted of distributing and
exhibiting leaflets that called for the unification of white people to
halt the encroachment-of black people upon white neighborhoods.'"
The Court stated that the statute was not a "catchall enactment"
but rather a "law specifically directed at a defined evil, its language
drawing from history and practice ... ."120
The Court recognized that the enactment of legislation by itself
may not ease the tension and violence amongst racial groups.' 2 In
the absence of any alternative means, however, legislative action is
one way to approach the problem. The Court realized that "the legislative remedy might not, in practice, mitigate the evil, or might
itself raise new problems, [or] would only manifest once more the
paradox of reform. It is the price to be paid for the trial-and-error
inherent in legislative efforts to deal with obstinate social issues." '
Proponents of the regulations may argue that legislation is the
only solution to the racial problems on campuses. In addition, regulations such as those drafted by the University of Wisconsin may
withstand constitutional scrutiny if a court applies the rationale of
the Beauharnais Court. The Court in Beauharnais, however, examined a very different forum from that of a college or university.
The fact that an academic atmosphere is pervasive at an educational
institution makes any regulation of speech an anomoly. As a result,
even a discussion that takes place outside a classroom could have
sufficient academic merit that it would have to be protected, even if
it is racially demeaning. The constitutionality of the Wisconsin regulations has thus been challenged by the American Civil Liberties
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

343 U.S. 250 (1952).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 471 (1949), cited in Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 251.
Id.
Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 252.
Id. at 253. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
Id. at 262.
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952).
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Union.1 3
C. Private vs. Public Institutions
Even if the regulations of a particular institution are drafted
narrowly, courts will apply a more stringent standard when reviewing the actions of public universities as opposed to private ones. A
public college or university, "created or controlled by the state itself,
is an arm of the state government and, thus, by definition, implicates
state action."' 2 4 In other words, since public colleges and universities
are state supported, they are required to abide by the laws of the
state in which they are located. The states, in turn, must abide by
the dictates of the Constitution by virtue of the fourteenth amendment.125 Private schools, on the other hand, remain "free to take positions which are often impossible or uncomfortable for the State
University."' 2 6 One commentator has stated the following in support
of allowing private colleges to maintain their independence:
Private educational institutions perform an essential social
function and have a fundamental responsibility to assure the academic and general well-being of their communities of students,
teachers and related personnel. At a minimum, these needs, implicating academic freedom and development, justify an educational institution in controlling those who seek to enter its domain. The singular need to achieve essential educational goals
and regulate activities that impact upon these efforts has been to
public educational institutions. Hence, private colleges and universities must be accorded a generous measure of autonomy and
self-governance if they are to fulfill their
paramount role as ve12 7
hicles of education and enlightenment.
Private schools cannot, however, use their status as a shield
from social realities. For example, in Bob Jones University v. United
States, 2 " the Supreme Court refused to accord tax-exempt status to
a privately funded school because it denied admission to applicants
123. France, Hate Goes to College, A.BA.J.,July 1990, at 44, 46.
124. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 552, 423 A.2d 615, 619 (1980).
125. See supra note 21.
126. Spencer, supra note 40, at 314 (stating in reference to a "speaker ban" bill that
would have prohibited speakers with dangerous views on campuses of public schools that "private institutions are not subject to state coercion of the insidious kind that states can impose on
public institutions").
127. State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 562, 423 A.2d 615, 629 (1980). This language is also
quoted in Finkin, On "'Institutional"Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 820 (1980).
For a discourse on academic ideology and its evolution, see Finkin, supra at 822-28.
128. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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who were married to members of another race.129 In addition, the
Court has applied pressure to private colleges that permit racial inequality by denying federally-funded aid for tuition."' 0
The state's ability to indirectly influence certain policies of private schools does not, however, accord it any control over the
school's decisions. In Furomoto v. Lyman,' the court discussed the
differences between private and public institutions. The plaintiffs
were former students of Stanford University, a private institution,

who were protesting their indefinite suspension from the university. 32 The plaintiffs were suspended after they interrupted a class in
protest of the professor's alleged racist views. 33 The university administration found that the plaintiffs' behavior violated Stanford's

policy against campus disruption.'

The plaintiffs' cause of action

was based on 42 U.S.C. § 198313' and claimed deprivation of civil
129. Id.
130. See Spencer, supra note 40, at 310. See also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455
(1973) (holding that a state could not loan books to a private school with racially discriminatory policies); M.M. CHAMBERS. THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS SINCE 1950, at 50-51
(1968) (stating that many private colleges and universities either voluntarily adopted desegregation plans or were never segregated because their charters forbade discrimination). See generally H. FRIENDLY. THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUMBRA,
at 29-31 (1969).
131. 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
132. Id.at 1271.
133. Id.
134. Stanford's Policy on Campus Disruption was as follows:
Because the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are fundamental
to the democratic process, Stanford firmly supports the rights of all members of
the University community to express their views or to protest against actions and
opinions with which they disagree.
All members of the University also share a concurrent obligation to maintain on the campus an atmosphere conducive to scholarly pursuits; to preserve
the dignity and seriousness of University ceremonies and public exercise; and to
respect the rights of all individuals.
The following regulations are intended to reconcile these objectives:
It is a violation of University policy for a member of the faculty,
staff, or student body to (1) prevent or disrupt the effective carrying out
of a University function or approved activity, such as lectures, meetings,
interviews, ceremonies, the conduct of University business in a University
office, and public events; (2) obstruct the legitimate movement of any
person about the campus or in any University building or facility.
Members of the faculty, staff, and student body have an obligation
to leave a University building or facility when asked to do so in the furtherance of the above regulations by a member of the University community acting in an official role and identifying himself as such; members of
the faculty, staff and student body also have an obligation to identify
themselves when requested to do so by such a member of the University
community who has reasonable grounds to believe that the person(s) has
violated section (1) or (2) of this policy and who has so informed the
person(s).
Furomoto, 362 F. Supp. at 1272-73, n.3.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides that:
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rights and privileges under the color of state law. The plaintiffs
charged that the university's regulations were unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. 136 They also contended that the regulations denied them rights guaranteed by the first amendment.' 3 7
The court stated that there were two theories under which it
could determine whether the university's representatives had acted in
compliance with the color of state law.' 38 First, "if an institution is
governmental in nature or serves a public function, its acts can be
viewed as state action."'3 9 Second, "if the state government is directly involved in the activity in question, private activity can become a state action."'4 0 The court found that neither theory supported the plaintiffs' contention that Stanford University was acting
under the color of state law since the state did not obtain any control
over the private university."'
2
More recently, in Haziewood School District v. Kuhlmeier,I"
the Supreme Court examined the first amendment rights of students
in public schools and concluded that if no public forum is established, "school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the
speech of students, teachers, and other members of the school community."' 43 It has been established that "once public forum status is
conferred, the university cannot, within constitutional strictures, arbitrarily curtail the rights of students to lawfully exercise their First
Amendment guarantees on university property."1"4 The Kuhlmeier
Court stated that "school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have (by 'policy or practice' opened
those facilities) 'for indiscriminate use by the general public.'""s
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
136. Furomoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267, 1273 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
137. Id.
138. When an institution acts under the "color of state," it essentially takes on the role
of the state in a legal proceeding. See supra notes 21, 123 and accompanying text.
139. Furomoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
140. Id. at 1276.
141. Id. at 1280.
142. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
143. Id. at 568.
144. Note, Shacking up with The First Amendment: Symbolic Expression and the Public University, 64 IND. L.J. 711, 717 (1989). See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 26768, n.5 (1981) (commenting that public university campus has the characteristics of a public

forum).
145.

Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. at 568.
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The school newspaper, according to the court, was not a public forum, and therefore was subject to censorship by the school
146
administrators.
As a result of the differences between the two types of institutions, public schools are more sensitive to constitutional guarantees
than private schools. This is especially true if the school is seeking to
regulate speech in a public forum.147 Although private colleges could
broadly restrict speech without constitutional ramifications, such restrictions are unlikely to be imposed if the college desires to maintain
its academic integrity.' 48 Essentially, both public and private institutions have an obligation to carefully tailor their regulations so as not
to infringe on any speech that is protected. Public schools, however,
should be aware that their actions are subject to a stricter
scrutiny
49
from the courts than are their private counterparts.'
D.

Academic Freedom vs. Freedom to Discipline

In Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District,' the Supreme Court recognized an inherent conflict between the constitutional rights of the students and the interests of the educational institution in maintaining discipline. The issue in Tinker was whether the
school could suspend students for wearing black armbands in protest
of the Vietnam war on grounds that the armbands disturbed school
discipline. 5 ' The Court found no evidence that school authorities
had any "reason to anticipate that the wearing of armbands would
substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon
the rights of other students."' 5 2 The students' constitutional rights
under the first amendment were upheld.' 53 Because students are
"persons" under the Constitution, "[s]chool officials do not possess
absolute authority over their students."' 5 4
In Stacy v. Williams,'5 5 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi also discussed the subject of speech
control in terms of the university's power over students' rights. 5 In
146.

Id.

147. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 129, at 20.
148. See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 124-41 and accompanying text.
150. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
151. The court stated that wearing armbands in this context constituted "pure speech"
which is "entitled to comprehensive protections under the First Amendment." Id. at 506.
152. Id. at 509.
153. Id. at 514.
154. Id. at 511.
155. 306 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
156. Id. at 969.
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Stacy, the court was confronted with the constitutionality of college
regulations regarding off-campus speakers.' 5 7 The court concluded
that "[t]he crux of a valid regulation must, in objective language,
preclude only that speech subject to being forbidden under the doctrine of clear and present danger."' 5 8 Thus, the court declared the
university's speaker regulations unconstitutional, but added that
"college students can have no valid objections to proper rules gov59
erning their conduct as members of the academic community."'
The underlying issue is whether the "gravity of the 'evil' discounted by its improbability" ' justifies the restrictions on free
speech in order to preempt the danger."' In Healy v. James,'6 2 the
Court commented that because such a situation
involves delicate issues concerning the academic community, we approach our task with special caution, recognizing the

mutual interest of students, faculty members, and administrators in an environment free from disruptive interference with the
educational process. We also are mindful of the equally signifi-

cant interest in the widest latitude for free expression and debate consonant with the maintenance of order. Where these interests appear to compete with the First Amendment made
binding on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, strikes therequired balance. 6
The Court also stated that the college could not restrict speech "simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent."' 64 The Court quoted Justice Black, who had commented that
"it can[not] be too often repeated that freedoms of speech, press,
petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be
accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied
to the ideas we cherish."'6 5 In addition, the Court also noted that
157. Id.
158. Id. at 973.
159. Id. at 969.
160. Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 971 (N.D. Miss. 1969). See supra notes 7487 and accompanying text.
161. Stacy, 306 F. Supp. at 971.
162. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
163. Id. at 171.
164. Id. at 187-88.
165. Id. at 188 (quoting Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1137 (Black, J., dissenting opinion)). The rationale behind maintaining a free flow of ideas, even though they may not
be appealing, is that some of these ideas may be worth something in the future. It could be to
the detriment of society to obstruct the development of such an idea. Essentially, the university
is "an intellectual experiment station where new ideas may germinate and where their fruit,
though still distasteful to the community as a whole, may be allowed to ripen until . . .it may
become a part of the accepted intellectual food of the nation or of the world." Finkin, supra
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"[w]hile a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption
on the 'campus, which under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that interest may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests
on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action."16
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,' 7 the Court stated that it is the
business of a university to provide an intellectually stimulating environment for its students.16 The court noted that restraining intellectual leaders from exercising free speech could "imperil the future of
our nation."' 69 This sentiment was later echoed by the Court in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 7 ° which held that a New York statute that attempted to regulate speech by a member of a public
school system who advocated the overthrow of the government was
unconstitutional. 171
The cases that address the conflict between the first amendment
rights of the students and the authority of the administration emphasize the necessity of protecting speech. The courts are concerned
about the rights of the students to maintain a free flow of ideas.
Unfortunately, the issue that colleges and universities face today is
more complex. The conflict lies not between students and the administration but among students only. On the one hand, all students
have a right to engage in free speech. On the other hand, no student
should feel demeaned or threatened because of his race or ethnic
origin. In an environment that has been virtually unregulated, it is
draconian to place limits on a right as fundamental as the freedom
to speak. In a university atmosphere, this right should be the most
sacred of all the rights conferred on students by virtue of their
enrollment.
note 126, at 827 (citing THE SEMINAL 1915

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ACADEMIC

FREE-

DOM AND TENURE OF THE AMERICAN ASs'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, reprinted in 2 AMERICAN
HIGHER EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 860-78 (R. HOFSTADTER & W. SMITH eds.

1961)).
166. Healy, 408 U.S. at 184. See e.g., Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363
F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (The court upheld a regulation barring "freedom buttons" because
proof showed that their presence in school caused commotion, boisterous conduct, a collision
with the rights of others, an undermining of authority, and a lack of order, discipline, and
decorum). Contra Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) (Court upheld the students'
right to wear "freedom buttons" because no other disturbance other than mild curiosity was
shown to have occurred in the school).
167. 354 U.S. 234 (1956).
168. Id. at 250.
169. Id.
170. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
171. Id.
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The Impracticality of Antidisciminatory Regulations

Colleges and universities may be able to circumvent the first
amendment issues raised by the antidiscriminatory regulations. They
may be able to justify placing restrictions on free speech by showing
the destructive nature of racist speech. Even if the regulations could
pass constitutional scrutiny, they should not be implemented because
the problems they would create would far outweigh any positive impact they would have.
First, the regulations might backfire and be used against "intemperate members of minority groups who are the intended beneficiaries of the laws."' 72 In other words, at some point in the future
the administration of a school may use the regulations to silence
members of minority groups who may be attempting to further their
cause. Second, the regulations could be viewed by minority students
as patronizing.17 3 In addition, because these regulations are not reflective of society, minority students would graduate from college unprepared for the racist views that do exist in society."' Finally, the
regulations would also exacerbate the racial tension on campuses by
further segregating the students. Interaction between students of dif-.
ferent racial groups may decline if the students fear that inadvertent
remarks could subject them to discipline.
The difficulty in arriving at this conclusion is that there are no
concrete alternatives. In order to explore possible solutions, one must
examine the root of the problem. Different theories have been proposed regarding the current state of racism at the universities and
colleges. Some educators have adopted the fatalistic view that the
situation is a development of the ideas voiced and implied by society.175 Even if this were the sole cause of racist speech, shouldn't
colleges and universities, as purveyors of future generations, attempt
to instill values that will promote racial harmony? As a solution,
some authorities suggest implementing more programs and classes to
benefit minority students.176 Opponents of this suggestion, however,
feel that such activity will only exacerbate the problem by keeping
the groups segregated. 77 Others feel that the Greek life on campus
172. France, supra note 122, at 48 (comment of Nadine Strossen, General Counsel for
the American Civil Liberties Union).
173. Id. at 46.
174. Id. at 49.
175. See supra note 39.
176. See Weiner, supra note 4, at 262.
177. See Sowell, The New Racism on Campus, FORTUNE, Feb. 13, 1989, at 115, 118
(Too many ethnic courses have acquired a reputation for low quality. To force these courses
upon students may "escalate an already ugly racial polarization.").
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is a major cause of tension, and that the elimination of fraternity life
would be a major step towards establishing racial harmony on
campus.' 78
Although many of these suggestions could be self-defeating,
there is a general consensus that increasing the number of minority
students and minority faculty, thereby increasing interaction between people of various backgrounds, would be the most effective
answer.1 79 The important factor to remember, however, is that the
students' intellectual capacities must match those of their peers so as
to keep all students on an equal footing and allow them to have mutual respect. 8 ' According to one educator:
[A] great deal of learning occurs informally. It occurs
through interactions among students of both sexes; of different
races, religions, and backgrounds; who come from cities and rural areas, from various states and countries; who have a wide
variety of interests, talents, and perspectives; and who are able,
directly or indirectly, to learn from their differences and to stimulate one another to reexamine even their most deeply held assumptions about themselves and their world. As a wise graduate
of ours observed in commenting on this aspect of the educational
process: "People do not learn very much when they are surrounded only by the likes of themselves."
In the nature of things, it is hard to know how, and when,
and even if, this informal "learning through diversity" actually
occurs. It does not occur for everyone. For many, however, the
unplanned, casual encounters ... can'be subtle and yet powerful
sources of improved understanding and personal growth. 8 '
V.

Conclusion

When campuses were in turmoil twenty-five years ago, students
were fighting for their constitutional rights, which included the right
to speak freely. At the same time, students were battling against racism on campuses. In retrospect, the two battles parallel each other.
Today, students are fighting about the same issues. Ironically, the
two issues are in conflict with each other, which makes it difficult to
apply precedents to the current situation.
178.
fraternity
179.
180.
181.
Sept. 26,
(1978).

See Weiner, supra note 4, at 262 ("On many campuses, racism is endemic to the
subculture.").
See Weiner, supra note 4, at 262-64.
See supra note 38.
Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY,
1977, at 7, 9, cited in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 n.48
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Unfortunately, there is no ideal solution to the problem facing
colleges and universities. It may be argued that the antidiscriminatory regulations that some schools have adopted are the perfect solution because the speech they are restricting is of minimal or
no value. Theoretically, the proponents of this solution are right.
Practically, however, it is impossible to draft regulations that do not
encroach on protected speech. The regulations drafted to date have
limited far more than racist speech. Even narrowly drafted regulations, however, would have the effect of inhibiting, rather than facilitating, racial harmony.
In addition, institutions of higher learning have a duty to maximize intellectual discourse. Universities and colleges should attempt
to educate the students and develop their awareness. Even though
the right to speak is not absolute, as one commentator has stated:
"the best solution seems to be fighting fire with fire-or speech with
more speech." 18' 2
Bhavana Sontakay

182.

Salhole, Everything But Shouting "Fire", NEWSWEEK, Oct. 20, 1986, at 70.

